AVOIDING MOONRAKER: AVERTING UNILATERAL
GEOENGINEERING EFFORTS

ANTONIA ELIASON*

“But the Agreement,” Mary said, sitting down on her chair and
focusing on her colleague’s voice. “You know what it says. No atmospheric
interventions without consultation and agreement.”
“We are breaking the Agreement,” Chandra said flatly.
—Kim Stanley Robinson1

ABSTRACT
Geoengineering has gradually moved from the realm of
forbidden technology to a real possibility for addressing the
increasingly devastating effects of climate change. Despite many
concerns regarding the effects of geoengineering on the planet as a
whole, absent drastic action from the global community to reduce
emissions, which does not currently seem likely, its deployment
seems inevitable in the near future.
This Article focuses on solar radiation management (SRM),
particularly on upper atmosphere and space-based mechanisms.
* Associate Professor, University of Mississippi School of Law. I would like
to thank the Spring 2021 University of Mississippi writing group for comments on
the draft. I would also like to thank PJ Blount, for whose space security law class
this paper was original written and with whom I had many interesting discussions
regarding the delineation between air space and outer space and the general legal
space security regime. Special thanks to my lovely husband Tom for giving me Kim
Stanley Robinson’s The Ministry for the Future, which provided me with much
inspiration in my revisions of the original draft, and to my son Leon, for whose
future I cannot help but worry.
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There are four main risks that must be evaluated in this area: (1) the
risk of geoengineering; (2) the risk of unilateral state action; (3) the
risk of unilateral private action; and (4) the risk of doing nothing.
The Article posits that our legal system is poorly designed for
addressing these risks, since it focuses on ex post actions rather than
providing ex ante measures to adequately evaluate and minimize the
risks. Unilateral actions by individual states or by private actors
cannot be adequately addressed by ex post legal measures, such as
liability regimes. There is a need for robust regulatory mechanisms
at an international level to mitigate the negative consequences that
unilateral action would inevitably give rise to. Even with such
regulatory mechanisms, however, the significance of the harm
caused by global temperature increases is such that it may outweigh
any potential negative consequences to states who are faced with the
choice between the survival of their people or adherence to
international legal standards.
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INTRODUCTION

In June 2021, researchers from Harvard University’s SCoPEx
(Stratospheric Controlled Perturbation Experiment) were scheduled
to launch a balloon above Sweden that would have released a small
amount of material to test the efficacy and risks of solar radiation
management (SRM) as a means of changing the climate.2 In March
2021, the launch was delayed to 2022 after a recommendation from
the SCoPEx advisory committee3 in response to concerns raised by
the indigenous Sámi people in Sweden. Opponents4 of this project
are concerned that it will violate an international moratorium on
geoengineering, particularly if it leads to further, larger scale
experiments, and that it could encourage the continued use of fossil
fuels without risk of climate catastrophe.5 Skeptics were quick to
point out the similarity between the mechanisms of the experiment
and the plot of the 2013 dystopian film by Bong Joon-Ho,
Snowpiercer.6 Indeed, geoengineering, or climate engineering, as it
is also known, seems straight out of the realm of science fiction. We
are, however, coming closer to it becoming a reality at the same time
that we are at a crossroads where lack of action from governments
combined with the growing threat and effects of climate change are
putting billions of lives at risk.

2
ScoPEx: Stratospheric Controlled Perturbation Experiment, KEUTSCH GRP. AT
HARVARD, https://www.keutschgroup.com/scopex [https://perma.cc/Z5L2RG94].
3
James Temple, Geoengineering researchers have halted plans for a balloon launch
in
Sweden,
MIT
TECH.
REV.
(Mar.
31,
2021),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/03/31/1021479/harvardgeoengineering-balloon-experiment-sweden-suspended-climate-change/
[https://perma.cc/98JE-3CU2].
4
Haley Dunleavy, An Indigenous Group’s Objection to Geoengineering Spurs a
Debate About Social Justice in Climate Science, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (July 7, 2021),
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/07072021/sami-sweden-objectiongeoengineering-justice-climate-science/[ https://perma.cc/ZJ57-G6TW].
5
Alister Doyle, Planned Harvard balloon test in Sweden stirs solar geoengineering
unease, REUTERS (Dec. 18, 2020, 10:04 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usclimate-change-geoengineering-trfn/planned-harvard-balloon-test-in-swedenstirs-solar-geoengineering-unease-idUSKBN28S232
[https://perma.cc/7XZ3EFMX].
6
Spencer Buell, Sure Hope this Snowpiercer-Esque Harvard Project Doesn’t End
Up like the Movie, BOSTON MAG. (Jan. 22, 2021, 4:21 PM),
https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2021/01/22/snowpiercer-harvardscopex/ [https://perma.cc/S34G-2KWN].

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol43/iss2/3

2022]

Avoiding Moonraker

433

Despite concerns regarding the potential dystopian effects of
geoengineering, it is increasingly possible that sometime in the near
future, geoengineering mechanisms will be deployed.
Understanding the legal landscape governing geoengineering is
therefore imperative in order to minimize the chance of a
Snowpiercer-like
situation
from
arising.
Furthermore,
conceptualizing how law may be limited in addressing issues
relating to the deployment of geoengineering, particularly with
respect to the relation between risk and law, offers a (perhaps
pessimistic) understanding of how our future is likely to unfold.
This Article argues that it is too late to advocate for a moratorium on
geoengineering, and that we must come to terms with the
inevitability of the eventual deployment of geoengineering
mechanisms to combat climate change. 7 Regulatory regimes can
only do so much to deter states from taking action, particularly
when faced with a choice between the survival of their people and
adherence to external imposed legal standards.
The threat posed by climate change has been well-documented
and acknowledged by scientists and lawmakers for decades. In the
nearly thirty years since the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was established,8 the international
community has struggled to take the necessary steps to reduce the
impact of climate change. Disagreement over the allocation of
responsibility, climate skepticism, and concerns that climate change
mitigation measures would hamper economic development have
overshadowed the existential crisis posed by climate change. 9
International environmental agreements have been unambitious in
setting targets for climate mitigation, yet neither the UNFCCC nor
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol mentioned climate adaptation. 10 This
7
The increasing inevitability of geoengineering can be seen in the changing
tone of articles by legal academics and policymakers over the past decade, from a
conceptualization of geoengineering as a remote policy to an acknowledgment that
some form of geoengineering is likely to be used in the near future.
8
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9,
1992,
1771
U.N.T.S.
107
[hereinafter
UNFCCC],
https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4RU2-PKL3].
9
See Antonia Eliason, Using the WTO to Facilitate the Paris Agreement: A
Tripartite Approach, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNT’L L. 545, 575 (discussing some of the issues
relating to sustainable development).
10
See What do adaptation to climate change and climate resilience mean?, UNFCCC,
https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/the-big-picture/what-doadaptation-to-climate-change-and-climate-resilience-mean
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reluctance to acknowledge that our collective failings will require us
to live with the effects of climate change has in part been motivated
by a desire to ensure that we primarily try to mitigate the effects of
climate change. The 2016 Paris Agreement marked the first time that
a
multilateral
international
environmental
convention
acknowledged climate adaptation in addition to climate
mitigation.11
Climate mitigation and climate adaptation are the two primary
branches of climate change management. The third branch of
climate change management, geoengineering, has yet to be
addressed by any international legal agreements. Geoengineering
is most commonly defined as “the deliberate large-scale
intervention in the Earth’s climate system, in order to moderate
global warming.”12 The uncertainty of geoengineering stems from
the potentially Earth-destroying unintended consequences of such
mechanisms. Even more than with climate adaptation, there is also
the concern that reliance on geoengineering would divert attention
from the much more pressing need to take significant measures to
reduce our greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and thus mitigate the
effects of climate change. As temperatures continue to rise,
however, and the possibility of staying below the 2C° temperature
increase provided for in the Paris Agreement seems increasingly
remote, attention is steadily turning to geoengineering.13
While there are a number of different types of geoengineering
mechanisms, this Article focuses on space-based geoengineering
and the security threats that it poses. There are four primary areas
of risk examined here: (1) the risk of the geoengineering
mechanisms themselves; (2) the risk of unilateral state action; (3) the
[https://perma.cc/M7J7-LTZT] (highlighting the UNFCCC’s definition of climate
adaptation as “adjustments in ecological, social, or economic systems in response
to actual or expected climatic stimuli and their effects or impacts. . . . [and]
refer[ring] to changes in processes, practices, and structures to moderate potential
damages or to benefit from opportunities associated with climate change”).
11
See Paris Agreement art. 7 § 1, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 (“Parties
hereby establish the global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity,
strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view
to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation
response in the context of the temperature goal referred to in Article 2.”).
12
THE ROYAL SOC’Y, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE, GOVERNANCE AND
UNCERTAINTY ix, 1 (2009).
13
Fred Pearce, Geoengineer the Planet? More Scientists Now Say It Must Be an
Option,
YALE
ENV’T
360
(May
29,
2019),
https://e360.yale.edu/features/geoengineer-the-planet-more-scientists-now-sayit-must-be-an-option [https://perma.cc/ZU49-BXLS].
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risk of unilateral private action; and (4) the risk of doing nothing.
The Article first provides an overview of SRM and the various types
of mechanisms covered under that umbrella. In Section II, the
Article turns to look at the applicable legal regime, providing a
broad overview of some of the key areas that may impact the
regulation of geoengineering. In Section III, the Article examines
each of the different categories of risk and highlights areas in which
the legal regime falls short, arguing that the ex post nature of most
legal solutions prevents meaningful ex ante action from being taken.
Finally, the Article offers some suggestions for how to remedy the
gaps in the existing legal regime.
II.

SOLAR RADIATION MANAGEMENT: AN OVERVIEW

Geoengineering falls into two main categories: carbon dioxide
removal (CDR) and solar radiation management (SRM).14 As this
Article focuses on space-based geoengineering mechanisms, CDR
mechanisms, which include large-scale afforestation, carbon capture
and storage, and ocean fertilization, are outside its scope. Solar
radiation management (SRM) includes “increasing surface and
cloud albedo, the methods of injecting stratospheric aerosols and
installing space reflectors.”15 SRM as a means of redressing climate
change poses enormous risks to the world’s population. While
much of the required technology is currently speculative in nature,
rapid technological advances and the growing recognition of the
crisis posed by climate change may mean that some of the SRM
mechanisms will be available for use in the near future. Certain
types of SRM are also relatively low-cost, making them accessible to

14
Gerd Winter, Climate Engineering and International Law: Final Exit or the End
of Humanity?, in CLIMATE CHANGE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE,
VOLUME I: LEGAL RESPONSES AND GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY 979, 981 (Oliver C. Ruppel,
Christian Roschmann & Katharina Ruppel-Schlichting eds., 2013).
15
Id. at 982 (“Large scale afforestation, BECS, biochar, enhanced weathering,
CO2 air capture, ocean fertilisation and CCS are all described as Carbon Dioxide
Removal (CDR), whereas increasing surface and cloud albedo, the methods of
injecting stratospheric aerosols and installing space reflectors are known as Solar
Radiation Management (SRM)”). Albedo is defined as “the fraction of incident
radiation (such as light) that is reflected by a surface or body (such as the moon or
a
cloud).”
albedo,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/albedo [https://perma.cc/4XK2-2YNR].
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many actors, whether at the private or at the state level. 16 SRM
mechanisms also have the potential to reduce temperatures more
rapidly than CDR mechanisms,17 increasing their attractiveness as
our climate situation becomes direr.
The primary concern relates to the irreversibility of SRM and the
consequent potential for planetary destruction that it raises.
Additionally, SRM gives rise to two types of moral hazard: first, that
countries could reduce efforts to mitigate climate change effects in
reliance on the possibilities of SRM; and second, that failure to
research geoengineering methods could lead to deployment of
insufficiently researched SRM mechanisms. 18 This becomes
particularly salient when we account for the disparities in the
technological capabilities of different nations, and the possibility
that Global North countries “might collaborate to pursue, over the
objections of poorer nations, stratospheric aerosol injection, even
though doing so could foreseeably result in disruption of the
monsoon relied upon by India, Bangladesh, and other nations for
agricultural productivity,” 19 to give but one example of potential
consequences.
SRM mechanisms stand in contrast to the generally less
controversial CDR mechanisms, which include reforestation and
afforestation, and various carbon dioxide capture mechanisms. This
Article focuses primarily on stratospheric aerosols and space-based
reflectors, but understanding the range of mechanisms is helpful in
understanding the scope of the controversy. Key to SRM is that
none of these proposed techniques would reduce GHG emissions.20
SRM also cannot compensate for such climate damage as ocean
acidification, and the maximum cooling potential is unclear.21

16
Andrew Lockley, Gideon Futerman & D’Maris Coffman, Geoengineering and
Public Trust Doctrine, 14 CCLR 85, 93 (2020).
17
Albert C. Lin, Avoiding Lock-In of Solar Geoengineering, 47 N. KY. L. REV. 139,
141 (2020).
18
Michael Burger & Justin Gundlach, Research Governance, in CLIMATE
ENGINEERING AND THE LAW: REGULATION AND LIABILITY FOR SOLAR RADIATION
MANAGEMENT AND CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL 269, 278 (Michael B. Gerrard & Tracy
Hester eds., 2018); see also NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., CLIMATE
INTERVENTION: REFLECTING SUNLIGHT TO COOL EARTH 152 (2015).
19
Burger & Gundlach, supra note 18, at 278.
20
NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 18, at 1.
21
Douglas G. MacMartin, Katharine L. Ricke & David W. Keith, Solar
Geoengineering as Part of an Overall Strategy for Meeting the 1.5°C Paris Target, 376
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A., Apr. 2, 2018, at 1, 2.
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a. Increasing Surface Albedo
Increasing surface albedo is the least controversial SRM
mechanism, since it involves simple, reversible actions like painting
roofs of buildings white to reflect more light, planting higher albedo
crops, covering desert surfaces with reflective materials, or floating
reflective microbubbles on just under the ocean surface to increase
ocean reflectivity.22 One of the main challenges of these methods
would be the scale of the deployment required to have substantive
effects on climate.23 Placing reflective materials across large swathes
of land would prevent alternative uses for the land, including use
for producing food crops or for afforestation that would sequester
carbon more efficiently. 24 On a small scale, however, increasing
surface albedo could be effective in temporarily reducing
temperatures in cities, staving off the worst effects of increasingly
hot summer days.
b. Cloud Brightening
Cloud brightening envisions “increasing the concentration of
cloud-condensation nuclei in the lower atmosphere, particularly
over ocean areas, thereby whitening clouds with the aim of
increasing the reflection of solar radiation.” 25 Cloud brightening
would involve ground-based or lower atmosphere-based efforts,
with current models envisioning spraying seawater into the air to
increase cloud reflectivity. 26 This would in turn attract water
droplets, which would create “clouds with smaller drops but more
of them” that would consequently be fluffier and have a more

NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 18, at 128-29.
Phillip Williams et al., Impacts of Climate-Related Geoengineering on Biological
Diversity, in GEOENGINEERING IN RELATION TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY: TECHNICAL AND REGULATORY MATTERS 5, 11 (Secretariat of the
Convention on Biological Diversity ed., 2012).
24
Id. at 74.
25
Id. at 8.
26
Michael B. Gerrard, Introduction and Overview, in CLIMATE ENGINEERING AND
THE LAW: REGULATION AND LIABILITY FOR SOLAR RADIATION MANAGEMENT AND
CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL 1, 2 (Michael B. Gerrard & Tracy Hester eds., 2018).
22

23
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reflective surface area.27 The drawback of this technique is that once
commenced, it would need to be continued indefinitely since halting
its use could result in rapid warming.28 This gives rise to what is
known as the “termination problem,” whereby a sudden end to the
SRM mechanism would quickly result in the climate reverting to its
ungeoengineered state.29 As discussed below, this is a key concern
with most of the SRM mechanisms.
c. Stratospheric Aerosols
Stratospheric aerosols would involve injecting particles,
particularly sulfates, into the upper atmosphere with the goal of
increasing the reflection of sunlight back into space.30 The Catch-22
of using stratospheric aerosols is that they could simultaneous
deplete stratospheric ozone while also blocking UV rays, leaving the
net effect uncertain.31 Furthermore, as with cloud brightening, once
commenced, without a significant decrease in GHG emissions, the
use of stratospheric aerosols would need to be continued to prevent
global warming from resuming at a much faster than current rate.32
While potential positives include an increase in plant
photosynthesis, since the sky would become brighter (estimates
range from three to five times brighter), the model is based on
replicating the effect of large volcanic eruptions and the subsequent
cooling that results from the sulfurous particles that are dissipated
throughout the upper atmosphere, which is empirically untested.33
The most cited example is the 1991 Mount Pinatubo event, which
has provided researchers with much of the observable data on these
kinds of phenomena.34
27
Eli Kintisch, Technologies, in CLIMATE ENGINEERING AND THE LAW:
REGULATION AND LIABILITY FOR SOLAR RADIATION MANAGEMENT AND CARBON
DIOXIDE REMOVAL 28, 34 (Michael B. Gerrard & Tracy Hester eds., 2018).
28
Id. at 36.
29
Albert C. Lin, The Missing Pieces of Geoengineering Research Governance, 100
MINN. L. REV. 2509, 2568 (2016).
30
Williams et al., supra note 23, at 8.
31
Jesse L. Reynolds, International Law, in CLIMATE ENGINEERING AND THE LAW:
REGULATION AND LIABILITY FOR SOLAR RADIATION MANAGEMENT AND CARBON
DIOXIDE REMOVAL 57, 71 (Michael B. Gerrard & Tracy Hester eds., 2018).
32
Kintisch, supra note 27, at 33.
33
Kintisch, supra note 27, at 29, 32.
34
NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 18, at 72; see also
Williams et al., supra note 23, at 50.
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Stratospheric aerosols have a relatively short lifetime, and
consequently the termination problem is significant. Abrupt
termination would potentially result in a rapid increase in global
temperature. 35 As will be discussed later, this risk requires that
there be clear mechanisms in place to address the governance of
geoengineering efforts during and after the deployment of
stratospheric aerosols.
d. Space-Based Reflectors
Although technologically the furthest off, space-based SRM
methods offer some of the more theoretically fascinating options to
reduce the effects of climate change. Possible techniques include
launching solar sunshades into Earth orbit, which would require a
careful balancing of weight and costs, as heavier sunshades are more
expensive to launch, while lighter ones are more vulnerable to being
disrupted. 36 An even more speculative proposal would involve
launching a ring of sunshades near the LaGrange 1 point, which is
one of five points where the Earth maintains the same position with
respect to the Sun. 37 This proposal would require launching ten
trillion small disks, which would amount to one million disks
launching every second for thirty years from the Earth’s surface.38
Due to the hypothetical nature of most of the proposed space-based
SRM mechanisms, there has been less discussion of their risks in the
available literature. There is merit in examining these risks,
however, since what appears technological distant today may very
well be a practical reality tomorrow.
With all of the SRM mechanisms, other than land-based
mechanisms to increase surface albedo, the big worry is the
termination problem, wherein ceasing to deploy such mechanisms
will result in a significant accelerated temperature rise.39 It has been
noted that the greater the magnitude of the SRM used in relation to
albedo modification, the greater the risk of severe impacts of abrupt

Lockley, Guterman & Coffman, supra note 16, at 86.
Kintisch, supra note 27, at 33.
37
Kintisch, supra note 27, at 33.
38
Kintisch, supra note 27, at 33.
39
Burger & Gundlach, supra note 18, at 279; see also NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF
THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 18, at 63.
35
36
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termination.40 The risk is magnified where CO2 emissions continue
to rise during the time the SRM is deployed, and where that increase
is countered by increasing the amount of albedo modification. 41
Related to the termination effect is the risk of technological lock-in,
whereby once SRM mechanisms are deployed, there can be no
variation from the technology initially chosen, due to the rapid
warming that would result from sudden withdrawal of the initial
mechanism.42 These risks will be discussed further below.
III.

APPLICABLE LEGAL REGIME

As geoengineering is a rapidly developing field and one that has
been the source of much controversy and debate, much has been
written elsewhere about the patchwork legal regime that applies to
geoengineering generally. 43 The discussion here focuses only on
those instruments most relevant to SRM mechanisms, particularly
stratospheric aerosol injections and space-based reflectors. As a
preliminary matter, the section provides an overview of the legal
delineation between sovereign air space and outer space, before
turning to the different categories of lex specialis applicable to
geoengineering, and then concluding with a brief look at general
public international law.
a. Delineation Between Sovereign Air Space and Outer Space
The legal regime that applies to outer space is a robust, treatybased area of lex specialis. With aerial SRM mechanisms ranging
NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 18, at 65.
NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 18, at 65.
42
DEBORAH GORDON, SMRITI KUMBLE & DAVID LIVINGSTON, ADVANCING PUBLIC
CLIMATE ENGINEERING DISCLOSURE 2 (2018).
43
See, e.g., Ralph Bodle, Geoengineering and International Law: The Search for
Common Legal Ground, 46 TULSA L. REV. 305 (2010); Winter, supra note 14; Gerrard,
supra note 26; Reynolds, supra note 31; Ralph Bodle et al., The Regulatory Framework
for Climate-Related Geoengineering in Relation to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
in GEOENGINEERING IN RELATION TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY:
TECHNICAL AND REGULATORY MATTERS 99 (2012); William C.G. Burns, Climate
Geoengineering, Solar Radiation Management and Its Implications for Intergenerational
Equity, 4 STAN. J.L. SCI. & POL’Y 37 (2011); Jesse L. Reynolds, Solar Geoengineering to
Reduce Climate Change: A Review of Governance Proposals, 475 PROC. R. SOC. A., Sept.
4, 2019, at 1.
40

41

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol43/iss2/3

2022]

Avoiding Moonraker

441

from cloud-brightening to space-based reflectors, the question is
what constitutes outer space for purposes of international law.
Space-based reflectors are the most speculative of the SRM
mechanisms, and are also the most clearly space-based of these
geoengineering techniques. Deploying reflectors at a LaGrange
point is unquestionably outer-space based. Where stratospheric
aerosols or methods by which surface and cloud albedo are
increased are envisaged, however, the question of what constitutes
outer space comes into play. The Outer Space Treaty does not define
where the sovereign air space of a state ends and international
commons of outer space begins, although this is commonly assumed
to be around 100 km above the Earth, 44 at what is known as the
Kármán Line. 45 Certain countries, including Australia, Denmark
and Kazakhstan, have adopted the view that airspace ends at 100km
above sea level, taking a spacial approach.46 At this distance from
Earth, the more speculative possibility of space reflectors is the only
SRM mechanism that would exist.
In the absence of a standard definition for where outer space
begins, some countries have taken a functionalist approach to its
delimitation, which suggests that the distinction between air space
and outer space should be made based on the objectives and
missions being carried out.47 The United States has taken a third
approach and has deliberately refused to draw any conclusions,
remaining agnostic and noting that there is no need to provide a
clear definition at this point. 48 These different position on the
delineation between sovereign air space and outer space reflect the
underlying question of whether the Kármán Line is in fact a reality.
The validity of the Kármán Line as a delineator has been challenged
by Thomas Gangale, who posits that it may have arisen as a
Winter, supra note 14, at 985.
Jonathan C. McDowell, The Edge of Space: Revisiting the Karman Line, 151
ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 668, 669 (2018). The Kármán line marks the point at the which
the atmosphere becomes too thin to support aeronautical flight. While commonly
set at 100 km, there are arguments that it could be lower, for instance at 80 km. Id.
at 668.
46
Timothy G. Nelson, Where does space begin? The decades-long legal mission to
find the border between air and space, SPACENEWS (Mar. 26, 2019),
https://spacenews.com/op-ed-where-does-space-begin-the-decades-long-legalmission-to-find-the-border-between-air-and-space/
[https://perma.cc/T2YWTZA3].
47
Michael Byers & Andrew Simon-Butler, Outer Space, in THE MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2020).
48
Id.
44
45
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misunderstanding between Andrew G. Haley, who coined the term,
and von Kármán himself.49
Closer to Earth, one of the proposed methods to disperse
stratospheric aerosols would involve the use of high-altitude
platforms, at a distance of 20+km from the planet’s surface.50 Highaltitude platforms consist of aircraft, whether airplanes, balloons or
airships, usually unmanned, that operate at an elevation above
20km from the surface in the stratosphere with a view to conducting
remote sensing operations or providing telecommunications
networks.51 These could also be used for dispersing stratospheric
aerosols, although as with other SRM technology, this is currently
experimental in nature. Applying a functionalist approach to outer
space, it could be argued that the nature of the activity conducted
from such high-altitude platforms could constitute activities in nearspace, which has been posited as existing between sovereign air
space and outer space. It also suggests that a need for a clearer
definition on the delimitation of outer space may arise in the near
future.
For purposes of the following legal analysis, stratospheric
aerosol injections are viewed as falling under state sovereignty,
while space-based reflectors are within the jurisdiction of laws
pertaining to outer space.
b. International Environmental Law
While all climate change measures fall broadly under the UN
Framework Convention for Climate Change, the 1992 Convention
does not explicitly provide for geoengineering.52 Enshrined in the
UNFCCC is the precautionary principle, with Article 3.3 stating that
“[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing
49
See Thomas Gangale, The Non-Kármán Line: An Urban Legend of the Space Age,
41 J. SPACE L. 151, 171 (2017).
50
See, e.g., Wake Smith & Gernot Wagner, Stratospheric Aerosol Injection Tactics
and Costs in the First 15 Years of Deployment, 13 ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS, Nov. 23, 2018,
at 1, 3 (noting that “[h]igh payload, high altitude aerostats have been hypothesized
but not yet successfully tested, and in all events, are operationally fragile . . . .”).
51
See Flavio Araripe d’Oliveira, Francisco Cristovão Lourenço de Melo &
Tessaleno Campos Devezas, High-Altitude Platforms—Present Situation and
Technology Trends, 8 J. AEROSPACE TECH. MGMT. 249, 249 (2016).
52
UNFCCC, supra note 8.
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such measures[.]” 53
Although this might suggest that
geoengineering should be pursued as a way to prevent threats of
serious or irreversible damage caused by climate change, the focus
of the UNFCCC and its application of the precautionary principle
has been on climate change mitigation. 54 The Paris Agreement,
while explicitly addressing climate change adaptation, marking a
shift from the mitigation-focused approaches of the UNFCCC and
the Kyoto Protocol, also does not reference geoengineering. In the
negotiation of the Paris Agreement, CDR was extensively discussed,
and the Agreement has a number of provisions that would appear
applicable to CDR.55 In contrast, SRM is not even implicitly referred
to in the Agreement, a result of concern that any discussion of SRM
might derail the negotiations.56
Geoengineering has only made scant appearances elsewhere in
international law. At the tenth meeting of the Conference of the
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),
geoengineering was explicitly referred to in Decision X/33, adopted
as part of that meeting. Paragraph (w) of Decision X/33 provides
that:
[I]n the absence of science based, global, transparent and
effective control and regulatory mechanisms for geoengineering, and in accordance with the precautionary
approach and Article 14 of the Convention, that no climaterelated geo-engineering activities that may affect
biodiversity take place, until there is an adequate scientific
basis on which to justify such activities and appropriate
consideration of the associated risks for the environment and

UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 3.3.
See Winter, supra note 14, at 998.
55
Joshua B. Horton, David W. Keith & Matthias Honegger, Implications of the
Paris Agreement for Carbon Dioxide Removal and Solar Geoengineering, HARV. PROJECT
ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS: VIEWPOINTS, July 2016, at 1, 3. Article 4 of the Paris
Agreement, for instance, refers explicitly to “removals by sinks of greenhouse
gases” and provisions on market mechanisms could provide support for CDR
technologies.
56
Kevin Keane, Geo-Engineering the Climate: A Preliminary Examination of
International Governance Challenges and Opportunities, 23 TRINITY COLL. L. REV. 56, 73
(2020).
53
54
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biodiversity and associated social, economic and cultural
impacts . . . .57
The Decision exempts small scale scientific research studies
conducted in a controlled setting.58 This cautious approach reflects
the way the CBD has enshrined the precautionary principle.
The precautionary principle importantly does not apply to
private individuals, and largely exists in the context of non-binding
frameworks. 59 Furthermore, due to the uncertainty in how the
principle has been interpreted across international law, in the
context of geoengineering it can be viewed either justifying taking
measures “to minimize the (unknown) risks to the environment and
health,” or alternatively to justify geoengineering as itself “a
precautionary measure against the (known) risks of climate
change.” 60 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) has promulgated voluntary guidelines for
multinational enterprises that recommend that enterprises account
for the need to protect the environment and that they be governed
by the precautionary principle and act proactively to minimize
environmental damage resulting from their activities.61 This focus
on environmental damage could be applicable in the context of
geoengineering, suggesting that multinational enterprises deploy
geoengineering measures with caution.62
Other environmental law instruments that could be relevant to
geoengineering include the Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution, the Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer of 1985 and its Montreal Protocol of
1987, and the 1991 Convention on Environmental Impact

57
United Nations Environment Programme, Decision Adopted by the Conference
of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its Tenth Meeting, X/33,
Biodiversity and Climate Change, UNEP/CBP/COP/DEC/X/33, ¶ (w) (Oct. 29,
2010) [hereinafter Decision X/33].
58
Id.
59
Elizabeth Tedsen & Gesa Homann, Implementing the Precautionary Principle
for Climate Engineering, 7 CCLR 90, 93-94 (2013).
60
Id. at 91.
61
OECD, Chapter VI: Environment, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES, 2011 EDITION 42, 45-46, ¶¶ 68-69. The Guidelines are “intended only to
recommend how the precautionary approach should be implemented at the level
of enterprises.” Id. at 46, ¶ 70.
62
See Daniela Lai, Deployment of Geoengineering by the Private and Public Sector:
Can the Risks of Geoengineering Ever Be Effectively Regulated?, 37 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMPAR. L. REV. 341, 363-64 (2016).
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Assessment in a Transboundary Context.63 Discussion of these are
outside the scope of this article. There are also a host of non-binding
multilateral environmental agreements that offer guidance.
Key principles of international environmental law that underpin
the legal regime include the polluter pays principle and the principle
of transboundary harm. These principles, which found their first
articulation in the Trail Smelter case, have been at the heart of
international environmental law for decades.64 Under polluter pays,
the producer of the pollution has the responsibility of bearing the
cost of managing the pollution to reduce harm to the environment
and to people who are victims of the pollution.65 The applicability
of this principle to SRM mechanisms is clear: if a state or a private
actor were to unleash an SRM mechanism that caused harm to
private individuals within that state, there should be a liability
mechanism to address compensation for those individuals.
Similarly, Principle 13 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development notes that states should cooperate in further
developing international law on liability and compensation. The
importance of polluter pays lies in its applicability to private as well
as state actors, unlike many other international law mechanisms and
principles.
The principle of transboundary harm finds expression in the
International Law Commission’s Draft articles on Prevention of
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities. 66 Article 1
defines the scope of the articles as applying “to activities not
See Gerrard, supra note 26, at 12-15.
See Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A Vol. III 1905, (Apr. 16,
1938 and Mar. 11, 1941) [hereinafter Trail Smelter Arbitration]; Rebecca M. Bratspies
& Russell A. Miller, Introduction, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION 1 (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A.
Miller eds., 2006).
65
The polluter pays principle is enshrined in Principle 13 of the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development (1992):
63
64

States shall develop national law regarding liability and compensation for
the victims of pollution and other environmental damage. States shall also
cooperate in an expeditious and more determined manner to develop
further international law regarding liability and compensation for adverse
effects of environmental damage caused by activities within their
jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their jurisdiction.
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), annex 1 (Aug. 12, 1992).
66
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Draft Articles on Prevention of
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities with Commentaries, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10 (2001).
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prohibited by international law and which involve a risk of causing
significant transboundary harm through their physical
consequences.”67 The “significant” standard originates in the ruling
of the Tribunal in the Trail Smelter arbitration, which found that
liability will ensue where “the case is of serious consequence and the
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.”68
With geoengineering, since much of it is very difficult to test
prior to deployment, there is a not insignificant risk of damage
occurring because of the geoengineering itself. International
environmental law offers a proactive ex ante avenue for mitigating
those risks, through mandating the use of an environmental impact
assessment (EIA) prior to the technology’s deployment. In Pulp
Mills on the River Uruguay, the International Court of Justice found
that if there is a risk of the activity having a “significant adverse
impact in a transboundary context,” an EIA must be undertaken.69
Where the potential danger is greater, the stringency of the EIA
required should arguably increase proportionally.70 It is clear, based
on the risks of geoengineering, that many of the methods proposed,
including stratospheric aerosol injections and space-based
reflectors, would require EIAs because of their transboundary
impacts.71
c. International Humanitarian Law
International law prohibits the use of force except in exceptional
circumstances. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prevents Members
from “threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
Id. ¶ 149.
Trail Smelter Arbitration, supra note 65, at 1965.
69
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶
204 (Apr. 2010). From the judgment:
67

68

In this sense, the obligation to protect and preserve, under Article 41 (a) of
the Statute, has to be interpreted in accordance with a practice, which in
recent years has gained so much acceptance among States that it may now
be considered a requirement under general international law to undertake
an environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the
proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a
transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resource.
70
Alexander Proelss, Geoengineering and International Law, 30 SEC. & PEACE 205,
206 (2012).
71
Karen N. Scott, International Law in the Anthropocene: Responding to the
Geoengineering Challenge, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 309, 345 (2013).
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political independence of any state.”72 While on its surface, it might
seem a tenuous claim to link geoengineering with the threat or use
of force, climate change may eventually result in a situation so grave
that it causes a security crisis for a state, thus requiring that it act. In
this area, the law of armed conflict provides some context, although
a critical difference is that war “is waged with intent to harm”73 and
geoengineering lacks that intent. However, as Elizabeth Chalecki
and Lisa Ferrari have argued, “when speaking of that scale of
involuntary environmental change—that is a distinction without a
difference.”74 Drawing on just war theory, they propose criteria for
the deployment of geoengineering, including that the “estimated
damage must meet some threshold in lives or dollars,” the threat to
security “must be publicly attributable to climate change” and the
cost of climate change mitigation or adaptation must be too grew to
afford to take too long to be effective.”75
One instrument that has been mentioned in the context of
geoengineering is the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or
Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
(ENMOD). 76
ENMOD requires that parties to the treaty
“undertake[] not to engage in military or any other hostile use of
environmental modification techniques having widespread, longlasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or
injury to any other State Party.”77 Article II defines “environmental
modification techniques” as referring to “any technique for
changing–through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes
–the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its
biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer
space.”78
With seventy-eight parties to the convention, including the
United States and Russia, ENMOD might seem clearly applicable
and of significant use with respect to geoengineering. However,
since this pertains to “hostile use,” this would seem to preclude its
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
Elizabeth L. Chalecki & Lisa L. Ferrari, A New Security Framework for
Geoengineering, 12 Strategic Stud. Q. 82, 87 (2018).
74
Id.
75
Id. at 95.
76
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques, opened for signature May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T.
333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter ENMOD].
77
Id. art. I.
78
Id. art. II.
72

73
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applicability to geoengineering, which notwithstanding any
potential harmful effect, is not something with a hostile intent.
Article III of ENMOD explicitly states that “[t]he provisions of this
Convention shall not hinder the use of environmental modification
techniques for peaceful purposes and shall be without prejudice to
the generally recognized principles and applicable rules of
international law concerning such use.” 79 Parties that might use
geoengineering would be doing so to try to avert catastrophe
relating to the effects of climate change, not to accelerate those
effects. Even if geoengineering is used to address national security
issues that “have become so severe that policy makers have begun
to see geoengineering as a possible means of ‘defense,’” this now
gives rise to ethical questions relating to “whether or not such
attempts could be both ethically acceptable and a net security
gain.”80
d. Space Law
Space-based reflectors implicate the outer space legal regime.
Here, the connection between potential harm caused by state actors
and liability ensuing from such actions becomes much clearer. The
Outer Space Treaty is clear in establishing that the exploration and
use of outer space “shall be carried out for the benefit and the
interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or
scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.” 81
From a geoengineering perspective, viewed in isolation, this
suggests that states that deploy SRM mechanisms in outer space to
reduce the effects of climate change across the planet would be
permitted to do so. However, other provisions of the Outer Space
Treaty make it clear that even well-intended actions in outer space
that have negative consequences on Earth will carry with them
responsibility and liability for the state deploying them.

79
Id. art. III; see also Karen N. Scott, Engineering the ‘Mis-Anthropocene’:
International Law, Ethics and Geoengineering, 29 OCEAN Y.B. 61, 74 (2015) (describing
ENMOD’s “value as a broader framework for geongineering” as “limited” given
Article III’s protection of environmental modification for peaceful purposes).
80
Chalecki & Ferrari, supra note 73, at 92.
81
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. I, Jan.
27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
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Article VI ascribes international responsibility for national
activities in outer space to state parties.82 Article IX states that all
activities in outer space must be “guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance” and must be conducted “with due
regard to the corresponding interest of all other States Parties to the
Treaty.” Article IX further requires that activities be conducted in
ways that avoid “adverse changes in the environment of the Earth
resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter.”83 While
SRM mechanisms as currently contemplated envisage the opposite
–introducing Earth matter to outer space–states must be cautious in
how they deploy SRM mechanisms, particularly if we reach the
technological stage where assembly of SRM mechanisms in outer
space using materials found in outer space becomes feasible. Most
crucially, Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty sets out the basis for
state liability, holding each state party to the treaty “that launches or
procures the launching of an object into outer space … is
internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty
or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component
parts on the Earth, in air or in outer space.”84
From Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty comes the Liability
Convention, which makes launching states “absolutely liable to pay
compensation for damage caused by its space object on the surface
of the Earth or to aircraft flight.”85 The Liability Convention appears
to focus on physical damage caused by space objects, and it is
unclear if the Convention would apply to effects caused indirectly
by space objects. Using the example of space reflectors, it would not
be the space reflector itself that would cause damage to the Earth,
but rather the effect of the space reflector in partially blocking the
sun and resulting in whatever catastrophic environmental effects
that might have.
Read together, the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability
Convention suggest that any party that launches even a wellintentioned SRM mechanism in outer space that results in negative
consequences to anyone on Earth, could be held liable for the
damage. Even if a narrower reading of the Liability Convention is
taken, the strict liability standard in that agreement indicates that
Id. art. VI.
Id. art. IX.
84
Id. art. VII.
85
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects
art. II, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability
Convention].
82

83
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concern regarding the possibility of space objects causing harm to
humanity is very real. The drafters could not have contemplated the
possibility of geoengineering at the time the Convention was agreed,
and it is possible that their intention would have extended to include
indirect damage where the “but for” cause was the deployment of
the space object in question, despite the space object not being the
primary physical actor in causing the damage.
The liability regime found in the Liability Convention is unique
in international law as the only example based entirely on state
liability.86 While the Liability Convention itself may have limited
applicability to geoengineering, since space-based reflectors remain
a cost-prohibitive and largely speculative mechanism, it can serve as
a model for an international liability regime that would be
applicable to geoengineering more broadly. 87 Unlike state
responsibility, which only applies where states violate their
international obligations, state liability means that a state may be
found liable for damages even where it has exercised due diligence
and where the actions it has taken are lawful.88
e. Public International Law
All the previously discussed legal areas form lex specialis, and as
such have significant overlap with core principles of customary
international law. Article III of the Outer Space Treaty, for instance,
expressly refers to carrying on activities in the exploration and use
of outer space “in accordance with international law.” 89 Some of
these international principles are at odds with each other, however,
including the state’s right to exploit sovereign natural resources and
the obligation on states to avoid transboundary harm.90
The principle of necessity may also offer states an avenue to
conduct geoengineering activities. Necessity is defined in Article 25
of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
86
Joshua B. Horton, Andrew Parker & David Keith, Liability for Solar
Geoengineering: Historical Precedents, Contemporary Innovations, and Governance
Possibilities, 22 N.Y.U. ENV’T. L.J. 225, 233-34 (2015).
87
Tracy Hester, Liability and Compensation, in CLIMATE ENGINEERING AND THE
LAW: REGULATION AND LIABILITY FOR SOLAR RADIATION MANAGEMENT AND CARBON
DIOXIDE REMOVAL 224, 249 (Michael B. Gerrard & Tracy Hester eds., 2018).
88
Horton, Parker & Keith, supra note 86, at 233-34.
89
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 81, art. III.
90
Gerrard, supra note 26, at 16.
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Wrongful Acts.91 States cannot invoke necessity as a justification for
taking an internationally wrongful act unless the act is the only way
for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and
imminent peril; and does not seriously impair an essential interest
of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the
international community as a whole. 92 States are further limited
insofar as they cannot invoke necessity if the state contributed to the
situation of necessity.93
In the context of climate change, if a state were to unilaterally
engage in geoengineering in a way that constituted an
internationally wrongful act, it could argue that the act was
necessary to safeguard its survival in light of the peril of climate
change. Depending on the effects of the geoengineering, however,
the act could seriously impair an essential interest of the other state.
Furthermore, envisioning a situation where the unilateral actor is a
state that is a major GHG emitter, that state would arguably be
precluded from invoking necessity since it contributed to the
situation of necessity through its emissions. The likelihood that a
unilateral geoengineering actor would also be a major GHG emitter
is high.
Running as a current through all of these different areas of law
is the question of liability. From the polluter pays principle and the
idea of transboundary environmental harm to the Liability
Convention in the space law regime, a liability regime provides the
most immediate form of legal resolution, by offering a
compensatory means to rectify the damage caused. What standard
applies, however, varies across legal agreements. Liability will be
further discussed below.
IV.

ISSUES WITH SRM

SRM remains problematic from both a legal and a moral
perspective. As a starting point, in relation to many of the SRM

91
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No.
10, art. 24, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts].
92
Id. art. 25(1).
93
Id. art. 25(2).
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mechanisms proposed, research itself is dangerous. As Gerd Winter
has argued:
It is not just the large-scale deployment of climate
engineering technologies that bears risks. Research into
climate engineering methods also poses a threat. It is
predicted that in situ experiments themselves could
constitute a major intervention of significant duration,
because a large-scale field trial would be necessary to
determine whether the experiment has produced intended
cooling separate from the usual temperature fluctuations.94
At the same time, not conducting research gives rise to the
potential for deployment of largely untested SRM mechanisms
should the climate crisis worsen to such a point that no alternative
appears possible.
As mentioned at the outset of the article, there are four primary
categories of risk: the risk of geoengineering, the risk of unilateral
state action, the risk of unilateral private action, and the risk of doing
nothing. Through the brief examination and evaluation of each of
these risks that follows, this section lays the groundwork for the
broader reflections on potential solutions and limitations that a legal
regulatory regime might have.
a. Risk of Geoengineering
Perhaps the most frequently cited risk of geoengineering is the
moral hazard risk. The concern that geoengineering research and
deployment might undermine climate mitigation efforts, including
the imperative requirement to reduce GHG emissions, permeates
much of the academic and policy literature. 95 The moral hazard
problem is real, with studies showing that individuals and societies
engage in more risky behavior when there is a transfer of risk.96 The
Winter, supra note 14, at 983.
See, e.g., Gerrard, supra note 26, at 11; CARROLL MUFFETT & STEVEN FEIT, CTR.
FOR INT’L ENV’T L., FUEL TO THE FIRE: HOW GEOENGINEERING THREATENS TO ENTRENCH
FOSSIL FUELS AND ACCELERATE THE CLIMATE CRISIS 46 (2019) (“Most proponents of
geoengineering research acknowledge the political and moral hazard risks of
geoengineering and even acknowledge how these ideas can be used by those
opposed to emissions reduction.”); Lin, supra note 28, at 2544.
96
Albert C. Lin, Does Geoengineering Present a Moral Hazard?, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q.
673, 688 (2013).
94
95

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol43/iss2/3

2022]

Avoiding Moonraker

453

moral hazard with geoengineering is that it “[m]ight be perceived as
an insurance policy against climate change, undermining support
for existing climate policies.”97 The challenge with geoengineering
is, therefore, the inverse of that of climate mitigation. Mitigation
requires all actors to do more, while geoengineering will require
limiting those with the capability to act “from doing too much, too
soon.”98
On a more implementation-focused level, geoengineering, as
discussed above, could result in a termination problem whereby if
CO2 emissions are not decreased while the SRM mechanism is in
place, once it ends, there will be a rapid increase in temperature,
particularly if the SRM has been in place for a long time. The effects
of such rapid termination could arguably be more severe than those
of gradual climate change, with reduced adaptation opportunities,
including less of a chance for population migration.99 It is therefore
not enough for a legal regime to address issues pertaining to
geoengineering research and initial deployment—the legal regime
must also be able to address how to terminate the SRM.
The “lock-in” effect poses another risk, with the potential for
certain technologies to become locked in and thus dominate the area
of SRMs, even where newer, more efficient technologies are being
developed.
Lock-in has occurred with fossil fuels, whose
dominance has locked-in the technologies dependent on fossil fuels,
through extensive and long-lived infrastructure and the interrelated
components. 100 It has also occurred with first generation climate
change-related technologies, including corn ethanol as a bioefuel.101
Lock-in may result from early advantages or from chance
circumstances, including economic factors such as economies of
scale, and political and social factors such as support and investment
in perpetuating certain technology from politicians, corporations, or
other entities.102
Legally, the risks of geoengineering and particularly SRM mean
that the existing legal infrastructure (or lack thereof) is inadequate.
While an EIA would provide some assessment of risk and could
97
Adam Corner & Nick Pidgeon, Geoengineering, Climate Change Scepticism and
the ‘Moral Hazard’ Argument: An Experimental Study of UK Public Perceptions, 372
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A., Dec. 28, 2014, at 1, 2.
98
Reynolds, supra note 31, at 7.
99
Williams et al., supra note 23.
100
Lin supra note 29, at 2542.
101
Lin supra note 17, at 145.
102
Lin, supra note 29, at 2541.
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help determine whether or not a particular geoengineering project
should move forward, the impossibility of conducting large-scale
testing means that there will always be potential unanticipated
adverse consequences.103 While it may seem reassuring that solar
reflectors in outer space are governed by the Liability Convention,
where such mechanisms cause irreversible changes to the Earth’s
environment, no amount of ex post damages can compensate for the
ensuing harm caused, and there is no comprehensive liability
regime that would apply to non-space-based geoengineering efforts.
By framing geoengineering in the context of intergenerational
equity, the temporal risk of SRM becomes clear. Intergenerational
equity centers around “fairness in the utilization of resources
between human generations past, present and future.” 104 Certain
SRM mechanisms may require legal governance that spans
centuries, 105 not the decades that our legal regimes are typically
constructed around. Even in the shorter term, SRM may impact
weather patterns, reducing precipitation and depleting the ozone
layer.106 The impact of SRM may limit climate change policy options
for future generations, as well as potentially creating negative
climatic impacts. 107 In addition to these challenges, long-term
governance requires anticipating what the priority of states may be
in the future, and what the face of international relations may look
like.108 There is not much in the way of precedent for this level of
intensive, long-term governance.
b. Risk of Unilateral State Action
In light of the many risks relating to geoengineering, efforts to
research and deploy SRM require multilateral coordination,
involving states as well as individuals. Right to information, right
to participation, and access to remedies are critical human rights that

Lai, supra note 62, at 354.
G.F. Maggio, Inter/Intra-generational Equity: Current Applications Under
International Law for Promoting the Sustainable Development of Natural Resources, 4
BUFF. ENV’T. L.J. 161, 163 (1997).
105
MacMartin, Ricke & Keith, supra note 21, at 13.
106
Burger & Gundlach, supra note 18; Reynolds, supra note 31.
107
Burns, supra note 43, at 41.
108
Reynolds, supra note 43, at 6-7.
103
104
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are necessary for meaningful, inclusive environmental protection.109
Unlike emissions reductions which require coordinated action from
all global constituents, from states through corporations through
individuals, geoengineering can easily be deployed unilaterally,
while having global impact. 110 Crucially, international law is
defined by states and it is within state sovereignty to decide how to
act, since states ultimately retain the ability to enforce international
law and to select which rules, outside of the limited principles of
customary international law and jus cogens norms, they choose to be
bound by. This limits the ability for international law to bind states
through future multilateral agreements designed to constrain the
ability of states to deploy SRM mechanisms.111
With respect to the risk of unilateral state action, unilateral
deployment of geoengineering may give rise to significant security
hazards, notably “the risk of breakdown of interstate cooperation—
including, ultimately, war.” 112 In relation to stratospheric aerosol
injections, the security risks posed are novel and have the potential
to be as disruptive in the 21st century “as nuclear weapons were for
the 20th.” 113 Failure of SRM mechanisms could drastically alter
weather patterns, for instance creating conflicting interests between
China and India over monsoon rains. 114 To take one example, if
solar reflectors are deployed at a LaGrange point, the sun will be
blocked in ways that affects the entire planet. Any discussion of
such methods should take place on a multilateral basis since
everyone will be affected.
The reality of SRM is that some of the mechanisms, particularly
stratospheric aerosol injections, are relatively low-cost, which makes
these mechanisms accessible to a wide variety of actors, including
smaller states. 115 Much of the discussion on the risks of
geoengineering has centered on the technological and financial
disparity between Global North and Global South countries and the
possibility that Global North states, the primary drivers of climate
109
Railla Veronica D. Puno, A Rights-Based Approach to Governance of Climate
Geoengineering, 50 ENV’T L. REP. 10744, 10748 (2020).
110
Scott, supra note 71, at 354.
111
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change, would unilaterally deploy geoengineering without
consulting with Global South countries, which are particularly
vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Another framing
envisions a small island state facing inundation and deciding to
unilaterally deploy geoengineering as a last resort.116 Both framings
are important to bear in mind, as both scenarios involve a risk of
unilateral state action.
As previously discussed, one of the great concerns involving
SRM is the moral hazard issue, “that the belief it could work could
induce some people to be less diligent in pursuing the far superior
(but more expensive) pathway of mitigation.”117 Here, the risk of
unilateral private action operates in tandem with the risk of
unilateral state action. Recent news reports indicate that climate
change skeptics are turning towards geoengineering as the realities
of climate change become overwhelming.118 Much of this research
is by private companies. At the international level, states are
refusing to disclose geoengineering research and have rebuffed
proposals that would require greater transparency and
cooperation.119
c. Risk of Unilateral Private Action
Whereas there are international legal rules that apply to states
and that may give them pause in deciding whether or not to pursue
unilateral state action with respect to geoengineering, such rules do
not apply to private individuals. Elizabeth Tedsen and Gesa
Homann have described the fear of a “Greenfinger”—what they
describe as a “single actor with the power to shape the global
environment.”120 They give the example of a July 2012 private ocean
fertilization experiment carried out by an American businessman,
Russ George, which resulted in a lot of media attention but no legal
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action, since he was not in breach of international law. 121 In this
experiment, the Haida tribe were given misleading information by
George regarding the intent of the project, and were not informed of
the risks or the international legal status of ocean fertilization.122 The
danger of misinformation exists no matter the actor (whether state
or private), but is heightened with private actors who, unlike states,
have no obligations to constituents other than perhaps to their
shareholders.
Much like with unilateral state action, the low-cost aspect of
certain SRM mechanisms makes the possibility of unilateral private
action more likely.123 Whether motivated by profit or philanthropy,
there is little standing in the way of private actors acting unilaterally.
International law does not address private actors, and there is no
binding multinational corporate governance in any area of the law,
only a patchwork of domestic regulations (which in many areas,
such as geoengineering, is limited if not nonexistent) and voluntary
corporate guidelines such as the OECD ones discussed above.
Customary international law imposes obligations on states to
conducts EIAs, for instance, but this obligation does not apply to
private entities and individuals.124 The best example of an effort to
enact binding international regulation of corporations in the area of
environmental law is the Convention on the Protection of the
Environment through Criminal Law, which requires state parties to
establish as criminal offences certain environmental offenses,
primarily relating to pollution. 125 While this criminal liability
regime might sound promising, the treaty, concluded by the Council
of Europe and opened for signature in 1998, only has thirteen
signatories and one ratifying party (Estonia). 126
Without
widespread approval, such initiatives are dead in the water.
In the United States, the Weather Modification Reporting Act of
1972 applies to both public and private activities, whether federal or
non-federal, but such instruments are insufficient to stop unilateral
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private actors, particularly where all they impose is a duty to
report. 127 Private actors should not be more than ancillary
participants in decision-making relating to geoengineering, since the
potential impacts are global and commercial interests should not
prevail.128 States are, of course, also flawed actors in the context of
geoengineering, being driven by self-interest and self-preservation,
but as they owe an obligation to their citizens and remain the key
players in international law, they are better suited to developing a
global governance regime.
One argument against the likelihood of unilateral private action
in the realm of geoengineering is the lack of profitability in the
deployment of such technology.129 For the wealthiest individuals on
the planet, the possibility of being heralded as a planetary savior
might be enough to motivate unilateral action—viewed as
philanthropy or altruism while actually reflecting a level of
narcissistic paternalism towards the world’s population. The
estimated cost of stratospheric aerosol injections130 is already well
within the reach of the world’s wealthiest individuals, who
individually have a greater net worth than many countries’ annual
GDPs. 131 A bigger deterrent may be the international backlash
against unilateral private action, particularly where certain SRM
mechanisms, like stratospheric aerosol injections, require concerted,
repeated actions, such as thousands of flights in a single year.132 It
would certainly be feasible for the international community to stop
such unilateral action by grounding the necessary flights.
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d. Risk of Doing Nothing
Skepticism of geoengineering and all its associate risks is
warranted, especially if it becomes a substitute for necessary
emissions abatement, without which there can be no real mitigation
of climate change. The risks of geoengineering have been amply
discussed above. There is another risk, however, which is the risk
of foreclosing the possibility of using geoengineering to address
climate change, i.e., the risk of doing nothing.
In Kim Stanley Robinson’s 2020 climate fiction novel, The
Ministry of the Future, a prolonged heat wave in India with wet-bulb
temperatures of over 35°C results in the death of twenty million
people. In the wake of the tragedy, the government of India decides
to move ahead unilaterally with the deployment of stratospheric
aerosols to create a Mount Pinatubo effect, lowering temperatures in
the short-term. While Robinson’s novel is, of course, fiction, the
reality of climate change means that we are seeing more instances of
extreme heat and humidity posing danger for human survival.133 A
wet-bulb temperature of 35°C marks the combination of heat and
humidity past which human survival becomes impossible with
prolonged exposure, and has already been observed multiple times
for short durations. 134 If emissions continue at the rate they are
going (the “business-as-usual” emissions scenario), modeling
studies suggest that by the third quarter of the 21st century, wet-bulb
temperatures over 35°C could be regularly seen in parts of South
Asia and the Middle East.135
In light of the devastation that extreme temperatures and other
climate change-related weather events could cause, geoengineering
may become a necessary arrow in the quiver of climate adaptation
and mitigation techniques, each of which contributes individually to
keeping the planet inhabitable. Before geoengineering mechanisms
can be deployed, however, there must be robust, monitored
133
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research. A moratorium on geoengineering research would
potentially have long-term consequences, leading to states making
uninformed and desperate decisions to deploy untested SRM or
other geoengineering mechanisms.136 Research carries its own risks,
but those risks are accompanied by increases in knowledge
regarding the viability of various technologies.137
A common critique of geoengineering is that is driven by, and
for the benefit of, the Global North. As will be discussed below,
there are many aspects of the proposed research and governance
regimes that are troubling from a development perspective. Climate
change is largely caused by the Global North, while the Global South
bears the brunt of its effects. 138 With climate risks greater in the
Global South, geoengineering may offer an opportunity to save lives
and avert the kind of disaster described by Kim Stanley Robinson.
SRM is particularly suited to contributing to a reduction in
global temperatures, which is the focus of the international climate
change regime. The Paris Agreement set a temperature warming
limit of 2°C above pre-industrial levels, with an optimistic goal of
limiting the increase to 1.5°C. 139 The 1.5°C temperature limit is
already out of reach, with increases in temperature of up to 2.7°C by
the end of the century now the most optimistic forecast in the wake
of the COP26 climate summit.140 If emissions reduction goals are not
met, SRM may become necessary to avert catastrophic warming.141
In this light, SRM may even be viewed as being in accordance with
principles of intergenerational equity, by protecting future
generations from the harmful effects of unmitigated climate
change. 142
It is important to remember, however, that
geoengineering is “a bandage to cover the wound that failing to act
would inflict on our successors on this planet.”143
Adaptation is more uncertain than mitigation and cannot
substitute for mitigation. The risks of geoengineering, and
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particularly the moral hazard that it entails, mean that all
geoengineering research must be conducted cautiously and that any
deployment efforts be matched with accompanying mitigation
efforts. As will be discussed below, one solution may be to couple
technologies—to require emissions reductions to accompany
stratospheric aerosol injections of sulfates, for instance. But it is too
late to pretend that our planet will have a future without every
possible arrow in the quiver to combat climate change, and for that
reason, the risk of doing nothing and pretending that
geoengineering does not exist and will not be used is arguably too
great of a risk.
V.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

Geoengineering requires participatory governance. To the
extent that we are considering such actions, multilevel negotiations
must take place. This would require the involvement of NGOs,
citizen groups, and other voices that usually do not have a seat at
the international law negotiating table. As the Royal Society noted
in a report on geoengineering from 2009, “[t]he central problem for
the governance of geoengineering is that while potential problems
can be identified with all geoengineering technologies, these can
only be resolved through research, development and
demonstration.” 144 As much as we might like to prohibit
geoengineering research due to the very real risks of catastrophic
planetary destruction that geoengineering might cause, the
possibility that we will face climate catastrophe requiring the
deployment of geoengineering methods to save us from extinction
is also a real possibility.
Analogues to the challenges facing geoengineering governance
may be found in two different contexts: the planetary defense
context and the nuclear non-proliferation context. The former
reflects the struggles of achieving multilateral action and the relative
successes of a piecemeal approach; the latter, while state-centered,
also carries with it the possibility of rogue private actors.
While efforts to reach a multilateral agreement on how to deal
with planetary defense against near-Earth objects have thus far
fallen short, global recognition of the risks posed by near-Earth
objects has resulted in a number of initiatives by unilateral state
144
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actors with multilateral support.145 This model offers a cooperative
alternative for multilateral agreements that could be applicable in
the SRM context. At the same time, in discussions of planetary
defense and near-Earth objects, we are looking at scenarios that
require cooperative action and where inaction would clearly cause
significant harm to the planet.146 Action by a state to divert a nearEarth object that resulted in it causing damage to property or human
life in another state would clearly give rise to liability under the
Liability Convention’s strict liability standard.
With
geoengineering, the path of inaction does not carry any immediate
risk—the latent risk there is that once climate change has progressed
too far, we will lack the technology to deploy last-ditch
geoengineering mechanisms. However, the incentive to conduct
research on a unilateral basis and even to deploy it on a unilateral
basis is much greater, since the applicability of the Liability
Convention and other aspects of international law, as we have seen,
is less clear-cut than in the context of planetary defense.
In relation to nuclear non-proliferation, the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons has 191 state parties, including all
five countries that officially have nuclear weapons.147 Concluded in
1968, the goal of the treaty was to prevent states from gaining
nuclear weapons and to encourage states with nuclear weapons to
disarm.148 The preamble of the treaty recognizes the “devastation
that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the
consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a
war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples.”149
The safeguards regime established by the treaty requires inspections
by the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify compliance
with the treaty.150
This model provides a good example of the kind of oversight
that would be required to ensure that any geoengineering research
was conducted in responsible and supervised manner. The
drawback, of course, is the lack of political capital to conclude such
a multilateral treaty with such universal buy-in with respect to
145
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geoengineering as compared to nuclear weapons. It almost seems
as if the only way to reach multilateral cooperation on
geoengineering would be to have a failed geoengineering
experiment with devastating consequences for a small portion of the
world, in much the same way that the United States’ use of nuclear
weapons against Japan and the subsequent arms race with Russia
frightened all countries, including the superpowers, into agreeing to
an effective détente.
The dangers of unfettered deployment of SRM mechanisms give
rise to a pressing need for solutions that would alleviate the gaps in
the existing legal regime. A multilateral treaty with enforcement
capabilities does not seem a likely possibility at the moment, nor
would it address the dangers of private entities deploying SRM
mechanisms. While the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement framework
offer an avenue for opening discussions on SRMs, an alternative
approach would see “a narrower group of states with interests in
conducting SRM research” leading the research, eventually leading
to “a fully inclusive governance approach,” which is necessary
“given the global implications of SRM.” 151 Proposals that would
leave certain states at the fringes of geoengineering governance,
however, give rise to significant problems.152 While some states may
struggle to fully participate in a geoengineering governance regime,
the possibility that Global South countries will find themselves
marginalized and omitted from discussions is troubling. One needs
only look at the Antarctic Treaty regime and concerns over the lack
of decision-making power given to state parties that have not been
“conducting substantial scientific research activity” to see the
disparate and unequal effects that such a tiered treaty system gives
rise to.153
One of the simplest SRM mechanisms to monitor is large-scale
albedo changes. Satellites can be used to detect the “unilateral and
uncoordinated deployment of albedo modification activities . . . .” 154
However, the capacity to launch satellites is limited to a small
151
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number of countries. Transparency and information sharing is
imperative to prevent those economically developed, mostly Global
North countries from dominating the geoengineering governance
landscape. Access to satellite technology and global information
systems is necessary to establish breach of the duty to respect the
environment, which requires showing that the geoengineering is
attributable to the state in question and that it is the geoengineering
activity that has caused the harm.155
Global governance notions that would prioritize the
involvement of countries that have the capacity to develop and
deploy SRM mechanisms entrench the existing problems with an
international legal system that privileges Global North countries
over Global South countries. This neo-colonial mentality is
unacceptable in the context of global geoengineering. Without
involving stakeholders that go beyond the large economies, there
should be no discussion of deploying SRM mechanisms.
SRM is novel and untested and in many ways unique, which
makes coming up with regulatory solutions particularly difficult.
An analogy can be drawn with geoengineering proposals relating to
ocean fertilization, which would seed the ocean with iron particles
to increase plankton blooms, and thus capture more carbon dioxide
from the atmosphere. 156 Here, this gives rise to the problem of
“permissible pollution” by which certain types of pollution may be
viewed as an acceptable means of addressing climate change. 157
Benjamin Hale and Lisa Dilling have argued that:
[O]cean fertilization is impermissible by virtue of its scope
and scale, because of the extent to which it is (1) caught up
in the antecedent and continuing actions of distributed
actors and (2) virtually impossible to arrive at a mutually
respectful outcome. In addition, we observe that (3)
conducting ocean fertilization moves the world to an
unknown “third state[.]”158
This unknown “third state” represents such a fundamental shift
in our understanding of how our planet functions that unilateral
action cannot be permitted. Further, even cooperative action
Bodle, supra note 43, at 306.
See Benjamin Hale & Lisa Dilling, Geoengineering, Ocean Fertilization, and the
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involving decisions by state actors would disenfranchise those who
might be most severely affected: indigenous people, poor people,
and others without the means to relocate should something go awry.
SRM should be viewed as a public activity, and in this context, a
state liability regime might provide an avenue for regulation. 159
Horton et al. have drawn an analogy between the oil spill liability
regime and SRM liability, suggesting that since compensation levels
have been adequate to satisfy damage claims resulting from oil
spills, this might be an appropriate model for SRM to follow.160 The
oil spill regime imposes liability onto private as well as public
parties, and it is suggested that payments under the liability regime
have had a deterrent effect, encouraging the oil industry to take
preventative safety measures. 161 Both of these claims raise some
questions. First, adequate compensation is taken to mean that there
has nearly always been compensation available to pay claims
resulting from oil spills,162 which is normatively quite different from
the claim that the compensation is adequate to compensate for losses
incurred as a result of oil spills. Second, the analogy between SRM
and the oil industry quickly breaks down upon closer inspection:
the oil industry is for profit, while SRM is not; while oil spills can be
environmentally devastating, they are generally more limited in
scope, both temporally and geographically, than SRM is likely to be.
Liability regimes are perhaps the most popular, straightforward,
and satisfying solution to the SRM governance gap. Yet in many
ways, a liability regime for geoengineering would be a governance
Band-Aid in much the same way that geoengineering is itself a
Band-Aid for climate change.
The moral hazard risk of
geoengineering—that states will reduce efforts to mitigate climate
change in reliance on the quick fix of geoengineering—applies to
liability regimes as well. A liability regime for SRM may result in
states and the international community reducing their efforts to
develop more robust governance strategies. Law tends to like ex post
solutions like liability regimes. We most often punish behavior that
has already happened, rather than preventing it from occurring.
With geoengineering, ex post solutions are clearly inadequate to
prevent the risk of unilateral action from states or private
individuals. This is not to say that liability regimes are a bad idea—
159
160
161
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they are absolutely necessary to provide those affected with a means
of compensation should geoengineering, whether sanctioned or not,
result in harmful effects. After all, unlike state responsibility, state
liability applies even where the conduct is not illegal and with the
uncertainty of the effects of geoengineering, such a regime is
needed. A state liability regime for SRM would also require holding
states responsible for unilateral private action that is deployed from
the territory of that state.
Ultimately, ex ante regulatory solutions like the nuclear nonproliferation regime need to be implemented in tandem with ex post
liability schemes for there to be effective governance of SRM.
Whether this is possible depends in part on whether states can come
to an agreement regarding the acceptability of geoengineering,
which in turn depends on whether fundamental differences
between Global North and Global South approaches to addressing
climate change can be resolved. This requires multistakeholder
governance, whereby voices from indigenous and local
communities are included in the discussions, echoing the call made
in CBD Decision X/33.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Geoengineering seems increasingly inevitable.
Despite
significant academic and policy work attempting to address the
legal and governance regime surrounding it, the problem of rogue
actors has been largely overlooked. Our liability regimes, whether
based on transboundary harm, polluter pays principles, or on the
Liability Convention in outer space, always view redressing harms
in an ex post fashion. Where the risks are such that deployment of
geoengineering mechanisms could result in irreversible harm to the
planet, this system is inadequate. Further, as wealth becomes
concentrated in the hands of a small number of multi-billionaires,
the argument that logistically, geoengineering is outside the scope
of an individual’s action becomes weaker. It is not unreasonable to
imagine a situation in which an individual would decide to act
benevolently to save the planet, and unwittingly doom it.
International law remains state-based, and there is no international
mechanism whereby private actors could be prevented from acting.
While banning all research on geoengineering might seem like a
safe solution, there is no guarantee that states and individuals would
adhere to such a ban. Furthermore, using geoengineering that has
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not been adequately tested and researched in a future crisis situation
where climate change has become so disastrous that the balancing
of the precautionary approach has shifted to a state where the risks
of doing nothing outweigh the risks of geoengineering would itself
have potentially catastrophic consequences.
Implementing something akin to a nuclear non-proliferation
regime with multilateral inputs from state as well as non-state
parties would be an important step to formalizing a legal
geoengineering governance regime. Unfortunately, as we see
increasing international fragmentation and disagreement over
geoengineering, the divide between Global South and Global North
countries comes to the forefront. The legacy of colonialism can yet
again be seen in the disagreement over how to approach
geoengineering. Where a small number of states and private actors
have the resources to unilaterally deploy geoengineering
mechanisms, it is unlikely that they will listen to the concern of those
states that are the most economically and environmentally
vulnerable as a result of the historical actions of those economically
dominant, primarily Global North states.
As a planet, we need to come together to reduce our
consumption of resources and pivot away from our extractive
practices, rather than rely on technological quick-fixes like
geoengineering. Unfortunately, if there is a lesson to be learned
from the responses of countries and people to the COVID-19
pandemic, it is that many of our societies, particularly in the Global
North, are too individualistic and selfish to make necessary lifestyle
changes to avert catastrophe. The prognosis for climate change
mitigation and GHG emission reduction in the short-term is grim.
In the long-term, it will be too late to rely on mitigation efforts alone.
It already may be too late.
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